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In 2016, the World Bank formally implemented a massive reform1 of the guidance it 
applies to procurements conducted under World Bank-financed projects.2  Other multilateral 
development banks have followed the World Bank’s example in harmonizing their procurement 
rules to those of the World Bank in the past,3 and so the Bank’s new Procurement Framework is 
likely to shape the procurement policies of the other multilateral development banks,4 as well as 
other international institutions.  Moreover, because of the prominent role that the World Bank 
plays in shaping procurement policy, the Bank’s reforms have had a profound impact on 
procurement in many countries around the world.5
The Bank’s reforms involved a “once-in-a-generation systematic reform and culture 
change,” with a new emphasis on capacity-building in borrower nations and “hands-on” 
implementation support from the Bank, as well as oversight through Bank guidance and 
1 See, e.g., Collin Swan & Sati Harutyunyan, Multilateral Development Banks In An Era Of Procurement Reform: 
How Larger Development Goals Are Shaping Revamped Approaches To Procurement, 58 Govt Contractor ¶ 
111(Apr. 6, 2016), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2760059.  
2 For an overview of how the World Bank manages its financed projects through the project cycle and the 
procurement process, see Sope Williams-Elegbe, Public Procurement and Multilateral Development Banks, ch. 5 
(Hart Publishing 2017). 
3 Id. at 59 (discussing other multilateral development banks’ harmonizing efforts to follow World Bank’s earlier 
procurement guidelines).  
4 In 2015, as the World Bank’s reforms were unfolding, the African Development Bank announced approval of its 
own new procurement framework, which is built on many of the same policies that undergird the World Bank’s 
Procurement Framework.  See, e.g., African Development Bank, Press Release:  AfDB Approves the New Bank 
Group Procurement Framework, Oct. 14, 2015 (Board of Directors of the African Development Bank Group 
approved the Bank’s new procurement framework), available at https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/afdb-
approves-the-new-bank-group-procurement-framework-14817/.  
5 See, e.g., Sope Williams-Elegbe, The World Bank’s Influence on Procurement Reform in Africa, 21.1 African J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 95 (2013). 
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regulations.6  The reforms were built on strikingly novel statements of policy, and included new 
procurement regulations to implement the many reforms, from enhanced complaints procedures 
to improved competitive procedures.   
I. Measures of Aid Effectiveness  
The Bank’s reforms were done against a backdrop of strong demands from across the 
world to improve the “effectiveness” of development aid.7  Those concerns were synthesized in 
two landmark documents, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra 
Agenda for Action (2008).8  With regard to capacity in procurement for development,9 the Paris 
declaration called for: 
• Strengthening partner (i.e., recipient) nations’ operational frameworks and capacities 
in their own country systems (including their procurement systems);  
• Respecting and bolstering partner nations’ leadership in their development; 
• Reducing redundancies due to special demands from donors; instead, donors 
committed to use “country systems and procedures to the maximum extent possible”; 
• Fighting corruption and a lack of transparency, which erode public support, slow 
mobilization, and divert vital resources; 
• Setting mutually agreed frameworks to allow reliable assessments of country systems; 
• Specifically with regard to procurement, donors and partner nations pledged to 
strengthen national procurement systems and support reforms, and to use mutually 
agreed standards and processes for assessment; donors committed to “[p]rogressively 
rely on partner country systems for procurement when the country has implemented 
mutually agreed standards and processes.” 
The Accra Agenda for Action followed on the Paris Declaration.  The Accra Agenda 
confirmed that donors would “strengthen and use developing country systems to the maximum 
extent possible,” and would work to ensure “that their procurement procedures are transparent 
and allow local and regional firms to compete.”10  Donors and developing countries were to 
6 World Bank, Procurement in World Bank Investment Project Financing -- Phase II:  The New Procurement 
Framework, at 1-4 (June 11, 2015), available at https://wbnpf.procurementinet.org/sites/default/files/Board-Paper-
phase-ii-the-new-procurement-framework.pdf. 
7 For a broader discussion of the aid effectiveness agenda and its effect on the multilateral development banks’ 
policies, see Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, ch. 9, The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Harmonisation, Tied Aid 
and the Use of Country Systems.  
8 Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.html.  
9 See, e.g., Bodo Ellmers, European Network on Debt and Development, How To Spend It:  Smart Procurement for 
More Effective Aid (Sept. 2011) (report based on six country case studies on procurement, aid untying and using 
country systems), available at http://eurodad.org/files/pdf/4639-how-to-spend-it-smart-procurement-for-more-
effective-aid-.pdf.  
10 See, e.g., African Development Fund, Implementing the Paris Declaration Commitments and Building on the 
Accra Agenda for Action:  Background Paper (ADF-11 Mid-Term Review, Oct. 2009, Helsinki, Finland), available 
at https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-
Documents/BP%20Implementing%20Paris%20Accra.FINAL.EN.pdf.  
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respect agreed anti-corruption principles, including those under the UN Convention Against 
Corruption.  Developing nations also were to fight corruption by “improving systems of 
investigation, legal redress, accountability and transparency in the use of public funds.” 
Using the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action as background to assess the 
World Bank’s recent procurement reforms as a matter of “aid effectiveness” this chapter focuses 
on key aspects of the reforms.  The chapter proceeds in six parts.  In Part II, the chapter provides 
a short history of the 2016 reforms.  In Part III, the chapter reviews the key principles that frame 
the reforms.  In Part IV, the chapter reviews the implementing guidance and regulations.  Part V 
reviews new challenges which may emerge, given the trajectory of the Bank’s reforms.  
Summing up the Bank’s new measures, Part VI concludes by assessing how these procurement 
reforms may, on balance, affect aid effectiveness in the Bank’s projects in the coming years. 
II. History of the Reforms
The World Bank was established by the Bretton Woods Agreement, to provide 
reconstruction aid in the wake of the destruction of World War II.11  The World Bank includes 
189 member countries, represented by the Board of Governors, who are generally the finance 
ministers for member nations and who meet once a year. The Board of Governors delegates 
specific duties to 25 Executive Directors, who work on-site at the Bank.  The nations that are the 
largest shareholders in the Bank each appoint their own executive directors, while the other 
member countries are represented by elected executive directors.  The Executive Directors make 
up the Board of Directors of the World Bank, and they oversee high-level policymaking at the 
Bank -- including policies regarding procurement.12
The World Bank Group is made up of five institutions, two of which are the focus of the 
procurement policies reviewed in this chapter:  the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), which typically lends to middle-income countries, and the International 
Development Agency (IDA), which provides grants and interest-free loans to the poorest 
countries.  When the World Bank provides support for projects through these institutions, it 
requires that the resulting procurements be conducted under certain policies and procedures 
mandated by the Bank.13
The World Bank launched the use of International Competitive Bidding (ICB) in 1951, 
and then promulgated procurement guidelines for use on its funded projects, founded on the 
Bank’s fiduciary obligations14 to ensure sound management of its funds pursuant to its Articles 
11 World Bank, History, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history.  
12 See generally World Bank, Organization, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership. 
13 See Sope Williams-Elegbe, The Changes to the World Bank’s Procurement Policy and the Implications for 
African Borrowers, 1 African Pub. Proc. L.J. 22 (2014). 
14 As the World Bank’s new Procurement Regulations note, the “Bank is required by its Articles of Agreement to 
‘make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was 
granted, with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-
economic influences or considerations.’”  World Bank, Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers § 1.2 (July 
2016, rev. Nov. 2017). 
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of Agreement.15  The Bank issued its first written procurement rules to provide guidance for staff 
in 1961, and in 1964 the first formal instructions on their use were approved by the Bank’s Board 
of Executive Directors. The first formal instructions on selecting consultants, used primarily for 
large engineering projects, were issued in 1966,16 and the Bank began requiring the use of 
standard bidding documents in the 1993.17
As these processes evolved over the decades, the Bank began to employ a “no objection” 
device for approving procurement methods and outcomes.18  Because the Bank is not a party to 
the procurement contract -- it is only a bank, or financier -- the Bank formally does not 
“approve” a procurement approach, but does not object: the Bank provides a formal notice of “no 
objection” at critical junctures in the acquisition process.19
By 2012, when the latest reforms launched, the World Bank had developed two sets of 
guidelines20 for borrowers to follow when conducting procurement in Bank-financed projects:  
(1) the “Procurement Guidelines” (known colloquially as the “red book,” because of the color of 
the booklet’s cover), which governed the procurement of goods, works, and non-consulting 
services,21 and the “green book,” the guidelines that were to be used when consulting services 
were procured.22  Over many decades, the world procurement community relied on these 
guidelines extensively, both for use in World Bank projects23 and as templates for broader 
procurement reform.  At the same time, though, the guidelines were often criticized24 -- 
especially the “red book,” for too narrowly emphasizing competitions based on low-price, not 
best value -- and in 2011, when the guidelines were updated, the World Bank decided to launch a 
review of its procurement policies.25  As the Bank put it, though for “over 50 years the Bank’s 
procurement approach ha[d] been a model of good international practice,” as “procurement has 
15 See, e.g., Peter Trepte, All Change at the World Bank?  The New Procurement Framework, 2016 Pub. Proc. L. 
Rev. 121, 122 (discussing history and Articles of Agreement). 
16 World Bank, Operations Policy & Country Services, The World Bank’s Procurement Policies and Procedures:  
Policy Review -- Initiating Discussion Paper 1-2 (Mar. 29, 2012) [hereinafter “Initiating Discussion Paper”], 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/257896-1335553632562/Initiating-Discussion-Paper-
Eng.pdf.  
17 Id. at 3. 
18 Id. at 2 n.4 
19 For an example of how the “no objection” process worked in World Bank-financed procurements before the 
reforms implemented in 2016, see, e.g., World Bank, The World Bank Operations Manual:  Bank Procedures -- 
Procurement, BP 11.11 (Jan. 2011, revised Apr. 2013), 
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01541/WEB/IMAGES/BP11_0-5.PDF.  
20 See, e.g., Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 58-64. 
21 See, e.g., World Bank, Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under IBRD 
Loans and IDA Credits by World Bank Borrowers (2014), 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/492221459454433323/Procurement-GuidelinesEnglishJuly12014.pdf.  
22 See, e.g., World Bank, Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD Loans 
and IDA Credits by World Bank Borrowers (2011, rev. 2014), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/Consultant_GLs_English_Final_Jan2011_Revi
sed_July1_2014.pdf.   
23 See, e.g., Allen Green, International Government Contract Law § 5:5 (West 2017) (available on Westlaw). 
24 See, e.g., Whitney Debevoise & Christopher Yukins, Assessing The World Bank's Proposed Revision Of Its 
Procurement Guidelines, 52 Gov. Contr. ¶ 180 (2012). 
25 See Initiating Discussion Paper, supra note 16, at viii. 
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matured as a profession in an environment of globalization and rapid information exchange, the 
Bank’s global procurement leadership ha[d] fallen behind good international practice and 
need[ed] to be modernized.”26
After several years of preparations27 and meetings with thousands of shareholders,28
including governments, representatives of the private sector, trade bodies, Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s),29 the World Bank’s 
Board of Executive Directors approved the new Procurement Framework,30 which became 
effective in July 2016.  
III. Central Principles of the New Procurement Framework 
The reforms launched in 2011 ultimately went far beyond merely revising the World 
Bank’s Procurement Guidelines.  Framed as a new “procurement framework” which took effect 
in July 2016,31 the reforms marked, in many ways, entirely new approaches for the World Bank, 
and for the broader development community.  While the World Bank’s new procurement 
framework is implemented through a complex suite of documents available on the World Bank 
website, the key principles that underpin the new framework are set forth in a master policy 
statement, Bank Policy:  Procurement in IPF (Investment Project Financing) and Other 
Operational Procurement Matters.32
The Bank’s policy document explains the core principles and goals of the new 
procurement framework, and outlines some of the means used.  The policy states: 
Procurement in IPF operations supports Borrowers to achieve value for money with 
integrity in delivering sustainable development. To achieve this vision, the Bank seeks 
assurance from Borrowers that acceptable procurement arrangements are applied to 
the financial resources it provides to Borrowers, and supports Borrower countries in 
enhancing and implementing sound procurement systems and institutions. The Bank 
may support country capacity building at the level of the project or as part of the 
country dialogue, using a range of measures—funding, technical support, and hands-
on expanded implementation support (in selected cases)— depending on the specific 
context of the country, sector, agency, or project.33
26 World Bank, Procurement in World Bank Investment Project Financing -- Phase II:  The New Procurement 
Framework, supra note 6, at 11. 
27 Id. at 12 (describing preparatory steps over three-year process). 
28 See, e.g., Peter Trepte, supra note 15, at 121. 
29 See World Bank, Procurement in World Bank Investment Project Financing -- Phase II:  The New Procurement 
Framework, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
30 World Bank, New World Bank Procurement Framework Approved (July 21, 2015), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/07/21/world-bank-procurement-framework.  
31 See, e.g., Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 64-76; Collin Swann & Sati Harutyunyan, supra note 1.
32 World Bank, Bank Policy:  Procurement in IPF and Other Operational Procurement Matters, Cat. No. 
OPSVP5.05-POL.144 (Nov. 7, 2017), available at 
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/a3656cb78847417b886f11fa0235216e.pdf. 
33 Id. at 2. 
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As this overview reflects, the core purpose of the procurement guidance -- oversight through 
management requirements, to ensure the Bank’s funds are well spent -- remains unchanged from 
the earlier era of the Bank’s “red” and “green” procurement guidelines.  This core goal stems 
from the Bank’s fiduciary obligation to its contributing shareholders, to safeguard the funds 
entrusted to the Bank for development.  Beyond that core goal, however, this new framework 
looks to new tools, especially capacity-building, to bolster the Bank’s oversight, direction and 
support for procurement in borrower nations.  
To frame this new approach, the policy document sets forth key principles used in the 
Bank’s procurement framework.  Among other things: 
• Although it is tucked away in the Bank’s array of guiding principles, “fit for 
purpose” was arguably the most important guiding principle for Bank officials in 
reshaping the Bank’s oversight of procurement.  The Bank’s policy document 
explains that “fit for purpose” applies to both “intended outcomes and . . . 
procurement arrangements,” and it  means “determining the most appropriate 
approach to meet the project development objectives and outcomes, taking into 
account the context and the risk, value, and complexity of the procurement.”  By 
refocusing oversight on the projects and problems that pose the greatest risk,34 and by 
allowing borrowers to use a broader array of procurement tools to accomplish 
purchasing goals, the principle of “fit for purpose” has played a powerful role in the 
Bank’s new procurement framework. 
• The Bank’s policy emphasizes “value for money” -- the principle that demands the 
“effective, efficient, and economic use of resources,” with an “evaluation of relevant 
costs and benefits, along with an assessment of risks,” and “non-price attributes 
and/or life cycle costs.” In a procurement framework that stresses value for money, 
the policy notes, “[p]rice alone may not necessarily represent value for money.”35
• The policy introduces the principle of “economy,” a term which might normally be 
associated with efficiency or even parsimony, but which the Bank’s policy applies to 
a much more diverse array of concepts, such as sustainability, quality, and non-price 
attributes and/or life-cycle costs.  To make sense of this principle, perhaps it is better 
to see it as a euphemism for change -- as a signal that the Bank is willing to embrace 
a range of ideas that were irreconcilable, traditionally, with rigid competitions based 
on low price alone. This new principle of “economy,” it should be stressed, goes 
beyond mere flexibility in procurement method -- it specifically allows borrowers to 
integrate “sustainability criteria” (which, depending on the national context, could 
span from “green” procurement to local economic development goals) in “support of 
the Borrower’s own sustainable procurement policy,” a new approach that could, in 
34 See, e.g., World Bank, Procurement in World Bank Investment Project Financing -- Phase II:  The New 
Procurement Framework, supra note 6, at 7 (focus on high-risk projects). 
35 Id. at 3. 
Draft Chapter - World Bank Reforms - Christopher Yukins & Sope Williams-Elegbe v5 - AS POSTED.docx 
7 
effect, allow borrowers to close off competition from abroad as borrowers used 
purchasing to advance social and political goals closer to home. 
• The policy’s approach to “integrity” reflects both the promise and the limitations of 
the Bank’s role, and also builds on the Bank’s increasing concerns about corruption.36
Probably inevitably given the diversity of its stakeholder community, the Bank’s 
approach is more instrumental than normative:  its policy does not approach integrity 
as an end in itself, but rather as a means to ensure the “use of funds, resources, assets, 
and authority according to the intended purposes and in a manner that is well 
informed, aligned with the public interest, and aligned with broader principles of 
good governance.”  The Bank’s approach thus deals with corruption more as an 
agency problem37 -- a problem of diverting public resources for personal ends -- than 
as a symptom of social collapse.  As a practical matter, this leaves the Bank standing 
somewhat apart from the social and political forces gathering against corruption 
around the world.  At the same time, though, this approach allows the Bank to focus 
on improving the effectiveness of the procurement functions the Bank is nurturing in 
the developing world, by treating “integrity” more clinically as a means of reducing 
performance and reputational risks in procurement, and as a means of reducing 
fiduciary risk in development. 
• The Bank’s approach to “transparency” in its policy document reflects the Bank’s 
sometimes awkward role as a multilateral development institution caught between 
politics and practical necessity.  Outside the Bank, the “open government” movement 
treats transparency as an absolute, on the assumption that unflinching openness will 
transform governance to make it much more responsive to citizens’ needs and 
views.38  While the Bank voices support for open government,39 its policy treats 
transparency in a more traditional, instrumental way, as a means of ensuring open 
communications among an existing network of contractors, officials and stakeholders.  
The policy calls for transparency to allow an “appropriate review of . . . procurement 
activities, supported by appropriate documentation and disclosure.”  Transparency, 
the Bank’s policy says, requires that “relevant procurement information be made 
publicly available to all interested parties, consistently and in a timely manner, 
through readily accessible and widely available sources at reasonable or no cost” (i.e,, 
online), that there be “appropriate reporting of procurement activities” (to ensure 
accountability and effective oversight), and that confidentiality provisions in contracts 
be used only where justified (to ensure that private imperatives do not overwhelm 
public goals of transparency).  The Bank’s policy thus reflects the traditional push-
36 See Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 13, at 25-26. 
37 See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, A Versatile Prism:  Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent 
Model, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 63 (2010) (applying agency theory to procurement), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1776295. 
38 See, e.g., Open Government Partnership, Open Government Declaration (2011) (discussing principles of open 
government), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/open-government-declaration. 
39 World Bank, Brief:  Open Government (June 18, 2015) (Bank’s adherence to principles of open government), 
https://www.opengovpartnership.org/open-government-declaration.  
Draft Chapter - World Bank Reforms - Christopher Yukins & Sope Williams-Elegbe v5 - AS POSTED.docx 
8 
and-tug over transparency between established stakeholders in the procurement 
community, and leaves for another day the emerging question of whether all public 
functions, including procurement, should be fully transparent. 
• The Bank’s policy’s approach to “fairness” is perhaps the most telling.  For the Bank, 
“fairness” is not an agonized normative matter; it is, instead, a rolling effort to 
manage competing demands among the Bank’s many stakeholders.  To reconcile 
those demanding voices, the Bank stresses the need for open competitive procurement 
-- the traditional answer for “fair” procurement -- and defines fairness largely in terms 
of process, not norms.  “Fairness,” for the Bank, refers to affording bidders equal 
opportunity and treatment, and distributing rights and obligations fairly between 
borrowers and suppliers, bidders, consultants and contractors.  Finally, fairness means 
“credible mechanisms for addressing procurement-related complaints and providing 
recourse” (a topic we will return to below, in our discussion of the Bank’s 
procurement complaints mechanism).
The Bank’s policy document also touches on more practical concerns in implementing 
the new procurement framework.  The policy discusses “Alternative Procurement 
Arrangements,” under which the Bank may agree to rely upon the procurement rules of another 
multilateral agency or organization, may agree to allow that other organization to take the lead in 
implementing and monitoring a project’s procurement, or may even rely directly on the 
procurement rules of a borrower nation’s responsible agency.  (These “Alternative Procurement 
Arrangements” are discussed further below, in Part IV.)   
Finally, and importantly, the policy confronts conflicts of interest -- which were, 
ironically, the concerns which launched some of the Bank’s earliest procurement reforms in the 
decades after World War II.40  The Bank’s policy extends explicitly now to both personal 
conflicts of interest and what are commonly known as “organizational” conflicts of interest (a 
conflict of interest a firm may have, for example, in drafting specifications against which that 
same firm may later bid).41  Importantly, the Bank’s policy says that “all parties involved in the 
Procurement Process [shall] not have a conflict of interest, unless such a conflict has been 
resolved in a manner acceptable to the Bank.”42 This last point is important, because it makes the 
Bank the ultimate arbiter on issues of conflicts of interest -- a sound approach if the goal is to 
contain reputational and operational risk from conflicts of interest, but with serious potential 
issues, practically and structurally.  Read strictly, this policy means that any issue of conflict of 
40 See Initiating Discussions Paper, supra note 16, at 2.   
41 See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
Procurement, Art. 21 (2011), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/2011-
Model-Law-on-Public-Procurement-e.pdf; U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 9.5, 48 Code of Federal 
Regulations Subpart 9.5; Whitney Debevoise & Christopher Yukins, supra note 24 (citing Daniel I. Gordon, 
Organizational Conflicts of Interest: A Growing Integrity Challenge, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 25 (2005); Peter Braun & 
Ceren Birespek, Conflicts of Interest in Public Award Procedures: Deloitte Business Advisory NV v. Commission of 
the European Communities, 2008 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA53 (European case law and rules regarding firms’ conflicts 
of interest)). 
42 Bank Policy:  Procurement in IPF and Other Operational Procurement Matters, supra note 32, at 4 (emphasis 
added).  
Draft Chapter - World Bank Reforms - Christopher Yukins & Sope Williams-Elegbe v5 - AS POSTED.docx 
9 
interest would need to be vetted by the Bank, which is a practical impossibility given the vast 
reach (and overwhelming complexity) of the Bank’s work.  From a policy perspective, this 
policy (again, if read strictly) would place the Bank in the role of what is known as a “third-
party” monitor -- a trusted observer that oversees a threatening situation which may yield 
conflicts of interest and deviant behavior.43  When a third-party monitor fails, that failure can be 
catastrophic precisely because of others’ reliance; making a commitment to review all conflicts 
of interest thus may be too taxing for the Bank, and may in practice leave its stakeholders with a 
false sense of security and oversight.  We will return to this topic again below, in Part IV.
IV. Key Elements of the World Bank’s Procurement Framework  
As noted, although touted as an attempt to simplify procurement oversight at the World 
Bank, the Procurement Framework was in fact presented as a highly complex suite of 
interrelated policies and requirements.  Key policies were reviewed above; here, we will address 
important regulations and guidance in the Procurement Framework, focusing on those -- 
specifically, the new Procurement Regulations -- that appear to relate most directly to aid 
effectiveness goals per the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. 
A. The Bank’s Procurement Regulations 
The document at the heart of the new Procurement Framework is the Procurement 
Regulations, which set basic requirements for procurement done by borrowers.  As before, the 
new Procurement Regulations keep the Bank at arm’s length from the borrower’s procurement 
contract itself:  they explain that the Legal Agreement which frames the borrower’s obligation to 
the Bank stands apart -- as the Bank stands apart -- from the borrower’s procurement contract 
with a vendor.44  At the same time, the Procurement Regulations make clear the Bank’s 
unshakeable oversight over the borrower’s contracting:  the Regulations closely guide the 
borrower’s procurement when the borrower uses Bank financing, and the Regulations explicitly 
state that even if a borrower’s contractor with a vendor is not financed by the Bank but is part of 
a Bank-financed project, the borrower may adopt other procurement rules and procedures only if 
“if the Bank is satisfied that . . . the rules and procedures will fulfill the Borrower’s obligations to 
carry out the project diligently and efficiently.”45
The Procurement Regulations provide crucial guidance on a number of initiatives which 
relate directly to aid effectiveness, including Alternative Procurement Arrangements (which 
would, in principle, allow borrowers to use their own procurement rules), complaints (the Bank’s 
form of bid challenges, and an opportunity for the Bank to exercise oversight over troubled 
procurements), anti-corruption measures and procurement methods. 
1. Alternative Procurement Arrangements (APAs) 
43 See Christopher R. Yukins, supra note 37, at 30 & n. 34.  
44 Procurement Regulations, supra note 14. 
45 Id. ¶  2.3. 
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One of the most conspicuous reforms in the new Procurement Framework was the Bank’s 
endorsement of Alternative Procurement Arrangements (APAs), by which the Bank will allow 
borrowers to use their own procurement rules if they meet certain criteria.  The Bank’s embrace 
of APAs follows an extended period of trial and failure, during which the Bank launched a pilot 
program to assess borrowers’ use of their own national procurement systems for major Bank-
financed projects.  (Smaller procurements can be done using National Competitive Bidding 
(NCB), under the borrower’s existing rules.)  The “Use of Country Systems” (UCS) initiative 
largely failed,46 probably in part because the Bank expected borrowers, to be eligible, to use 
procurement systems that mirrored the Bank’s own procurement guidelines.47
The apparent failure of the “Use of Country Systems” initiative did not, however, end the 
concept, because allowing borrowers to use their own systems was a core element of 
internationally recognized aid effectiveness goals (discussed in Part I, above).  The Banks’ 
Procurement Framework called for the use of APAs to allow borrowers (or their agencies) to use 
APAs, subject though to strict assessment requirements.  Specifically, the Bank’s Procurement 
Regulations said that the Bank may allow borrowers to use their own procurement rules for 
specific agencies or procuring entities, subject to the Bank’s requirements.48
As of this writing, the Bank still has not finalized its assessment requirements for APAs.  
Draft assessment standards have been developed, based upon the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Methodology for Assessment Procurement Systems 
(MAPS), adjusted to include an additional element which assesses procurement operations.  The 
proposed approach also would use data from past procurements, and input from the private 
sector and civil society organizations (CSOs), to assess whether the nominee agency (or country) 
is an appropriate candidate for an APA.49  More on the assessment methodology is presented in 
chapters 9 and 10 of this book. 
2. Anti-Corruption Measures 
The Procurement Regulations under the Bank’s new framework reflect a mix of old and 
new anti-corruption strategies.  The Bank’s anti-corruption measures have, over time, gathered 
strength as the Bank has come to see corruption as a major obstacle to development. 50  And as 
the Bank allows its borrowers to use more sophisticated and riskier methods of procurement, 
46 See, e.g., Christopher L. Pallas & Jonathan Wood, The World Bank’s Use of Country Systems for Procurement:  A 
Good Idea Gone Bad?, 27 Dev. Pol. Rev. 215 (2009) (discussing Bank’s earlier efforts to allow borrowers to use 
their country systems for procurement, as part of broader initiatives to improve aid effectiveness). 
47 See Peter Trepte, supra note 15, at 128-31 (discussing the history of the World Bank’s “Use of Country Systems” 
initiative in detail); Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 251-256 (“Use of Country Systems” initiative). 
48 Procurement Regulations, supra note 14, ¶ 2.4 (“At the Borrower’s request, the Bank (subject to its policies and 
rules, and applicable fiduciary and operational requirements), may agree to . . . rely on and apply the procurement 
rules and procedures of an agency or entity of the Borrower.”). 
49 See World Bank, A Draft Guide to the APA Assessment:  Assessment Methodology to Assess Alternative 
Procurement Arrangements in Borrower Implementing Agencies for Procurements Financed Under IPF (July 
2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/634391468437110489/Alternative-Procurement-Arrangements-Guide-to-
the-Assessor.pdf.  
50 See Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 178-187 (history of World Bank’s efforts against corruption in 
procurement). 
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such as competitive dialogue (discussed below), the anti-corruption systems deployed by the 
Bank’s borrowers will become more important. 
The Bank’s Procurement Regulations embrace an emerging strategy to check corruption:  
monitoring by independent third parties.  Under the new Regulations, when procurement 
strategies (such as competitive dialogues) present additional risk,51 borrowers may retain a 
“Probity Assurance Provider,” an “independent third party that provides specialist probity 
services for concurrent monitoring of the Procurement Process.”52  These monitors may be 
private firms or may come from civil society organizations (CSOs).53
The Probity Assurance Providers may work closely with Bank staff who provide “Hands-
On Expanded Implementation Support” (HEIS) when borrowers have urgent capacity 
constraints.54  The HEIS assistance is itself arguably an anti-corruption device, for it allows Bank 
officials to be involved directly in drafting procurement documents, assessing proposals, 
observing dialogues and negotiations, and drafting evaluations and award documentation -- thus 
providing both capacity support and monitoring with experienced Bank staff.  Although Bank 
officials providing HEIS assistance are not to usurp the key decision making to be done by 
borrowers, such as the procurement award decision, the HEIS assistance can assist borrowers “to 
deliver effective procurement processes beyond the normal implementation support” the Bank 
would provide.55
Otherwise, the Bank’s anti-corruption measures were generally strengthened but not 
radically changed by the 2016 reforms.56  Fraud and corruption concerns were given special 
prominence in the new complaints procedures (see below), so that those will gain special 
attention from the Bank and the borrower as they arise.57  The conflict-of-interest provisions in 
the new Procurement Regulations,58 for example, generally track those of the prior Procurement 
Guidelines.59  As was noted above in the discussion of the Bank’s guiding principles, the Bank’s 
approach to integrity remains instrumental, still largely removed from more normative questions 
51 When preparing a Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD) (the precursor to a formal procurement 
plan), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/847531467334322069/PPSD-Long-Form.pdf, borrowers are expected to 
assess whether “any proposed additional oversight (e.g. probity assurance)” is required, such as “due to risk in the 
proposed procurement arrangements (such as use of negotiations, competitive dialogue).”  World Bank, Project 
Procurement Strategy for Development:  Short Form Detailed Guide, at 43 (July 2016), 
https://wbnpf.procurementinet.org/sites/all/themes/npf/misc/documents/PPSD-Short-Form-Final-June-30.pdf; see 
also Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 83-84 (describing PPSD).
52 See Procurement Regulations, supra note 14. 
53 For an interview describing CSOs’ efforts to monitor procurement in various projects around the world, see 
Interview with Christopher Yukins and Donal O’Leary, Sabine Engelhard and Lars Jeurling of the Partnership for 
Transparency Fund (PTF) (2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lNnM-AH67s. 
54 World Bank, Bank Guidance:  Procurement Hands-on Expanded Implementation Support, Cat. No. OPS5.05-
GUID.167, §  III.A.7 (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/3c801309d23748bd932e756bf58468ac.pdf. 
55 Id. § III.A. 
56 See Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 187-215 (detailed review of anti-corruption measures in Bank-
financed procurement). 
57 See Procurement Regulations, supra note 14, ¶  3.31.
58 See id. ¶ 3.14. 
59 See Procurement Guidelines, supra note 21, ¶ 1.6 et seq. 
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such as public censure.60  Furthermore, the anti-corruption sanctions that the Bank undertakes are 
focused on specific (and past) acts of contractor misconduct,61 and not more broadly on ensuring 
that performance and reputational risks are reduced in Bank projects on an ongoing basis.62
3. Focusing Oversight on Procurement Risk 
A cornerstone to the Bank’s new Procurement Framework -- the logical extension of the 
“fit for purpose” principle discussed above -- is to focus the Bank’s oversight and reviews63 on 
high-risk and/or high-value procurements.64  The process for triggering a review is complex: 
• Procurement risk is assessed independently, based on factors such as perceived 
capacity in the borrower agency, market conditions and the procurement approach to 
be used.65
• That perceived risk (“low” to “high”) is then assessed against a sliding dollar scale; 
high-risk projects, for example, will trigger a review at lower dollar value.66
Thus, the procurement risk is very much assessed from the Bank’s perspective -- the reviews 
focus on addressing the Bank’s fiduciary obligations and the need to mitigate risk in the 
procurement itself, not on the performance risks that the project (or its beneficiaries) may face.   
The Bank’s Procurement Procedure appears to confirm that focus, because it mandates 
reviews when certain procedures which the Bank considers inherently risky (such as competitive 
dialogue)67 are used.68  These risks are not necessarily linked to the borrower’s performance risk; 
instead, these are risks tied to a potential failure of the procurement itself, i.e., a failure to 
purchase best value.  
60 See Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 215-216. 
61 See, e.g., Procurement Regulations, supra note 14, Annex IV, ¶ 2.2. 
62 See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, Rethinking the World Bank's Sanctions System, 55 Gov. Contractor ¶ 355 
(November 21, 2013), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2357691; Pascale Helene 
Dubois, Paul Ezzeddin & Collin David Swan, Suspension and Debarment on the International Stage: Experiences in 
the World Bank's Sanctions System, 2016 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 61; Johannes S. Schnitzer & Christopher R. Yukins, 
Combating Corruption in Procurement, in UNOPS, Future Proofing Procurement 26 (2016) (discussing how 
different anti-corruption strategies address different classes of risk, reputational versus performance), 
http://www.bhrinlaw.org/documents/2015-asr-supplement.pdf.  For a broader discussion of debarment systems used 
around the globe, see Sope Williams-Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement:  A Comparative Analysis 
of Disqualification or Debarment Measures (Hart Publishing 2012). 
63 See, e.g., Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 190-192.
64 See, e.g., Procurement Regulations, supra note 14, ¶ 3.5. 
65 World Bank, Project Procurement Strategy for Development -- Long Form Detailed Guidance, sections IV-V 
(July 2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/847531467334322069/PPSD-Long-Form.pdf
66 See, e.g., World Bank, Bank Procedure:  Procurement in IPF and Other Operational Procurement Matters, Cat. 
No. OPS5.05-PROC.136, Annex I (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/17dbb39aa89d40b18f01060d1ae1c383.pdf; Sope 
Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 191. 
67 Project Procurement Strategy for Development -- Long Form Detailed Guidance, supra note 65, at 17.  
68 Bank Procedure, supra note 66, at 25-26; Procurement Regulations, supra note 14, Annex II.3. 
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4. Procurement-Related Complaints  
The Bank’s new Procurement Framework included important reforms to the Bank’s 
procedures for handling procurement-related complaints.69  Under the reformed process, 
procurement-related complaints are to be submitted to the borrower in a timely manner, and the 
borrower is to track and address those complaints. The borrower is to resolve the complaints 
under either the procedures set forth in Annex III to the Procurement Regulations (for 
procurements covered by Standard Procurement Documents), under national complaints 
procedures agreed upon by the Bank (for national competitive bidding (NCB)), or, for 
Alternative Procurement Arrangements (discussed above), under complaints procedures agreed 
upon by the Bank.70  Where the procurement is subject to prior review, the Bank is to consider 
the complaint and timely consider the action proposed by the borrower.71
The World Bank’s complaints procedure operates, in a very loose sense, like “bid 
protest” or “remedies” procedures in national systems: the complaints procedure allows bidders 
to complain to the government running the procurement of failures in contract formation, and (in 
some cases) the Bank will play a monitoring role. Complaints (bid challenges) are sometimes 
viewed as anti-corruption devices, but given the institutional constraints on any complaints body 
-- they typically lack investigative authority or police powers, and have a specialized focus on 
procurement -- these reviewing bodies are probably better viewed as guardians of the 
procurement process.  Many nations now have bid challenge systems in place to supervise their 
own procurement systems,72 and the Bank’s complaints procedure builds on those institutions 
while providing, to a limited extent, another layer of review at the Bank. 
In framing reforms to the complaints procedure, the Bank noted that many in the private 
sector had requested much stronger Bank involvement when complaints arose regarding Bank-
financed procurements; the private sector argued that a more robust complaints process would 
build private confidence in Bank-financed procurement, which in turn would encourage stronger 
competition.73  To address these concerns, the Bank agreed to dedicate senior staff to advise on 
69 See Procurement Regulations, supra note 14,¶ ¶ 3.26 to 3.31 & Annex III; World Bank, Procurement- 
Procurement-Related Complaints:  How to Complain (2d ed. January 2017) (discussing complaints arising in 
connection with contracts where the Bank’s Standard Procurement Documents (SPDs) apply); Sope Williams-
Elegbe, supra note 2, at 284-291 (noting improvements from 2011 Procurement Guidelines to the 2016 Procurement 
Framework’s complaints process). 
70 Procurement Regulations, supra note 9, ¶¶ 3.28 & 3.30; World Bank, Webinar:  New Procurement Framework:  
Procurement-Related Complaints 12, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/690521503326539557/Webinar-Handling-
Procurement-Related-Complaints.pdf.  
71 Id. Annex III, ¶  3.9. 
72 Complaints systems are required, for example, by Article 9 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf, and by Article XVIII 
of the World Trade Organization’s revised Government Procurement Agreement, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-94_01_e.htm. See generally Daniel I. Gordon, Constructing a 
Bid Protest Process: Choices Every Procurement Challenge System Must Make, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 427 (2006), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=892781.  
73 See World Bank, Procurement in World Bank Investment Project Financing -- Phase II:  The New Procurement 
Framework, supra note 6, at 5-6. 
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and expedite procurement-related complaints.74  Under the new Procurement Regulations, all 
complaints regarding an International Project Finance (IPF) operation must be reported to the 
Bank (including for national procurements and procurements done using “Alternative 
Procurement Arrangements” (APAs)).  Debriefings to bidders regarding the bases for award are 
required, and standstill periods (to allow for a debriefing and, if necessary, a complaint) are now 
required under the Bank’s standard selection documents.  Complaints regarding contract awards 
are monitored by the Bank, and, for post-award disputes regarding contract performance, the 
Bank will facilitate dispute resolution. 
The new complaints process still appears to be a work in progress, and the normal 
remedies afforded by a bid challenge system generally are not available in the Bank’s own 
process.75  While the Procurement Framework puts the basic elements of a bid challenge system 
in place (e.g., borrowers’ debriefings are called for, interested parties are clearly defined, a 
standstill period is required, “business standard” deadlines are set, and there is an established 
process), the new framework, out of the Bank’s normal institutional deference, will leave the 
review largely to the borrower nation.76  There is no regular or transparent means of tracking 
complaints brought to the Bank, and there are no published decisions from the Bank to shed light 
on how the law is developing, or how recurring issues will be addressed.  To the extent the 
complaints process remains immature and incomplete, sophisticated bidders frustrated with a 
Bank procurement may turn first to the traditional alternative -- private requests for intercession 
by the Bank. 
The gaps in the Bank’s complaints process may be felt most keenly on those projects that 
now will fall outside the Bank’s close review, as the Bank focuses its oversight and resources on 
its highest-risk, highest-value projects (see above). The projects newly pushed to the periphery 
probably will still be just as important to the agencies involved, and just as strategically vital to 
the vendors competing for that work; the agencies and vendors, however, will no longer have the 
same benefit of Bank oversight.  This makes it more likely that there will a sort of centrifugal 
movement, away from the Bank’s central control, as vendors and other stakeholders seek out 
solutions for the problems that inevitably emerge.   
One obvious place to go will be the bid challenge forums in the borrowing nations.  The 
Bank’s Procurement Framework almost predicts that -- it leaves the complaints process in the 
hands of the borrower nations.  But the Bank’s Procurement Framework has no special place for 
building capacity in the bid challenge institutions emerging around the world, and the Bank’s 
own still incomplete complaints procedures say much about the Bank’s own apparent 
ambivalence about bid challenges.  
If vendors confronting corruption on Bank-financed projects cannot resolve problems in 
the borrower nations’ bid remedies systems, they may seek help from the rapidly growing 
network of anti-corruption agencies called for by various international anti-corruption 
74 Id. at 6. 
75 See, e.g., Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 291 (“it is a misnomer to talk of remedies in the traditional sense 
in the context of bidders on a Bank-funded procurement”). 
76 See, e.g., Peter Trepte, supra 15, at 149. 
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instruments,77 and bolstered by new anti-corruption laws, such as those in the United Kingdom78
and France.79
If vendors encounter more prosaic problems -- if they face not corruption, but simple 
bureaucratic collapse -- and they cannot rely on borrower nations’ bid remedies systems, vendors 
may possibly turn to relief under bilateral investment treaties.  Under certain circumstances, 
those treaties allow for investor-state disputes (which may be administered, ironically, through 
one of the World Bank’s own institutions, the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID)), and those types of disputes may emerge as an alternative remedy 
for investors frustrated with World Bank-financed procurements that now fall outside the 
narrowed band of review by the Bank. 80
While it is difficult to predict what pathway frustrated vendors may take, what is clear is 
that the Bank’s narrowed oversight, including its highly deferential complaints process, may 
have collateral effects which cannot be resolved simply by building capacity in borrower nations.  
Problems emerge in even more mature procurement systems (there are thousands of bid 
challenges brought in North America and Europe every year, for example), and the Bank’s new, 
narrower approach to oversight is likely to have spillover effects as contracting problems go 
unresolved in the normal course. The Bank’s more focused approach to oversight allows the 
Bank to focus resources on its points of highest risk, and in effect leaves more authority to 
borrower nations to police other projects -- an outcome that seems consonant with the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, but in practice could have a negative impact on 
Bank-funded projects.. 
5. Sustainable Procurement 
The Bank’s Procurement Framework includes new provisions allowing for sustainable 
procurement strategies,81 such as the special procedures outlined in Annex VII to the 
Procurement Regulations.  Sustainability, in the Bank’s view, extends to economic, 
environmental and social factors, and the Bank “encourages Borrowers to actively consider and 
apply sustainable procurement, where appropriate.”82  Although the Bank’s new framework 
allows borrowers to incorporate sustainability goals in procurement in an approach reminiscent 
77 See generally Sofia Wickberg, Transparency International, Best Practices for Anti-Corruption Commissions 
(2013), available at https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Best_practices_for_anti-
corruption_commissions_2.pdf.  
78 UK Bribery Act 2010, available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.  
79 Loi No. 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la 
modernisation de la vie économique (commonly known as the “Sapin II” law), available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2016/12/9/2016-1691/jo/texte. 
80 See, e.g., Yarik Kryvoi, Bribery, Corruption, and Fraud in Investor-State Disputes: How Should Tribunals 
Approach Economic Crimes?, Aug. 10, 2018, http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/08/10/bribery-
investor-state/.   
81 See, e.g., World Bank, Sustainable Procurement:  An Introduction for Practitioners to Sustainable Procurement 
in World Bank IPF Projects (Nov. 2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/788731479395390605/Sustainable-
Procurement-Guidance-FINAL.pdf; Sope-Williams Elegbe, supra note 2, at 155-157; Peter Trepte, supra note 15, at 
133-134. 
82 Procurement Regulations, supra note 14, ¶ 5.12 & Annex VII, ¶ 2.3. 
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of the European Union’s,83 the Bank still considers sustainability a procurement risk which will 
trigger a prior review.84
The Bank’s cautious approach to sustainability reflects a narrow path the Bank must 
tread.  There is broad support internationally for many of the goals of sustainability, such as 
addressing climate change and improving socio-economic conditions.  At the same time, 
however, “sustainability” remains only loosely defined,85 and sustainability goals can be used by 
procuring agencies for less lofty purposes, such as favoring advanced firms uniquely able to 
meet emerging sustainability goals.86  The Bank’s ambivalence is reflected in Annex VII to the 
Bank’s Procurement Regulations, which allow sustainability goals but stress that “sustainable 
procurement requirements should be based on evidence (i.e., with supporting data), and on 
existing social-label criteria, eco-label criteria, or information collected from stakeholders in 
industry, civil society, and international development agencies.”87  By demanding a documented, 
rational basis for sustainability goals, one informed by best practices and standards, the Bank 
apparently hopes to limit the risks of discrimination and corruption that sustainability might 
otherwise present. 
6. New Procurement Methods -- Including Competitive Dialogue 
While the Bank’s Procurement Framework endorsed a number of innovations in 
procurement methods, from a technical standpoint perhaps the most important was the Bank’s 
embrace of competitive dialogue.  Other methods were already gaining traction -- framework 
agreements were allowed under the prior Procurement Guidelines and electronic reverse 
auctions were already being addressed in practice by the Bank88 -- but the World Bank’s decision 
to accept competitive dialogue as a procurement method was a marked change, as many Bank 
officials had long been quite hostile to competitive dialogue and the corruption risks it brings.  
Although the new Procurement Regulations allow other new procurement methods as well,89 our 
focus here is on competitive dialogue both because it sheds light on what shaped the World 
83 See Peter Trepte, supra note 15, at 133-34. 
84 See, e.g., Bank Procedure, supra note 66, at 21 (World Bank Team Leader is to prepare “a memorandum . . .  
seeking . . . approval to include Borrower’s sustainability requirements (i.e., the application of social and economic 
criteria) in World Bank-financed procurement”); id. Annex I, ¶  2.2 (“irrespective of the contract value, the 
following procurement activities are subject to the Bank’s procurement prior review . . . (c) sustainable 
procurement”). 
85 See, e.g., Jeff Gutman, Book Review:  Public Procurement and Multilateral Development Banks: Law, Practice 
and Problems, 2018 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 96, 99. 
86 See, e.g., Rita Roos, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Sustainable Public 
Procurement in LICs[Low-Income Countries], at vii (2013) (“There is also the perceived risk of SPP [Sustainable 
Public Procurement] creating unfair competitive advantage for few (often large, international) firms able to comply 
with SPP standards.”), 
https://consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/meetings/Procurement_Policies/SPP_in_LICs.pdf.  
87 Procurement Regulations, supra note 14, Annex VII, ¶ 2.4. 
88 See, e.g., World Bank, e-Reverse Auction Guidelines for MDB Financed Procurement (Dec. 2005), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19058/883170WP0eReve00Box385191B00PUBLIC
0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.  
89 See, e.g., Peter Trepte, supra note 15, at 134-38; Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 131-42. 
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Bank’s new Procurement Framework, and it helps predict the role the Bank’s new framework 
will play in international development in the coming years. 
The Bank’s acceptance of competitive dialogue followed parallel developments around 
the world, such as the European Union’s embrace of competitive dialogue (and competitive 
procedure with negotiation, its close cousin) in the European procurement directives,90 the 
inclusion of a form of competitive dialogue in the 2011 rewrite of the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model procurement law,91 and the shift of much of U.S. 
federal contracting to a more liberal form of competitive dialogue, called “competitive 
negotiations,” under the Federal Acquisition Regulation.92
All these methods call for competitive multilateral negotiations, in which the purchasing 
agency enters into a “dialogue” with each offeror, either in writing or orally, through which each 
offeror can present a unique solution to the purchasing agency’s stated requirements.  This is a 
dramatic change from classic open tendering (called “sealed bidding” in the United States federal 
system),93 which proceeds from the assumption that the government customer can define its 
needs with precision and then award (generally speaking) based on low price.   
The shift internationally from open tendering (traditionally, the default method) to 
competitive dialogue reflects, in many ways, passage over a technological divide.  In a more 
primitive age, it made sense for a government to specify a uniform solution for its requirements, 
and then to award a contract for that uniform solution to the lowest bidder.  Rapidly advancing 
technology has changed that calculation, however, and competitive dialogue allows procuring 
agencies to choose among technologically advanced solutions -- solutions which may be 
idiosyncratic precisely because they are technologically advanced, and so do not lend themselves 
to low-price bidding against a defined set of requirements.  Competitive dialogue also gives 
government customers a “window” into emerging technologies, because vendors engaged in a 
competitive dialogue with a government customer will be more willing to disclose their 
advanced solutions in a closed environment of private exchanges.  Finally, because competitive 
dialogue (unlike traditional tendering) allows the government to choose among a more diverse 
array of potential solutions, it is more likely that the chosen solution -- the awardee -- will better 
“fit” the government’s actual requirements. 
In economic terms, competitive dialogue thus helps mitigate the principal-agent issues 
(discussed above) that normally burden public procurement.  By allowing the public buyer to 
90 EU Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU, Arts. 29-30, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0024; see also Office of Government Commerce, UK Government, 
Competitive Dialogue in 2008 (2008) (guidance on use of competitive dialogue and other procedures), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130102211752/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.  
91 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, supra note 41, Art. 49 (request for proposals with dialogue). 
92 See FAR Part 15, 48 Code of Federal Regulations Part 15; Christopher R. Yukins, The U.S. Federal Procurement 
System: An Introduction, 2017 Upphandlingsrättslig Tidskript 69, 81-84, available at 
https://www.urt.cc/?q=node/187; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063559.  
93 See FAR Part 14, 48 Code of Fed. Regs. Part 14.  See generally John Cibinic, Jr. Ralph C. Nash, Jr. Christopher 
R. Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts, ch. 4 (Aspen (Wolters Kluwer Legal) 4th ed. 2011).  
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engage directly with many diverse solutions in the marketplace through multilateral negotiations, 
competitive dialogue can mute the distorting self-interest of the intermediary, the contracting 
official, who traditionally might default to a uniform, inflexible solution to allow award to a low 
bidder.  Competitive dialogue allows for a more nuanced balancing of price and quality, and 
allows buyers to access diverse emerging technologies, and thus may reduce performance risk 
for the buyer.  (Conversely, the traditional strong preference for open tendering could retard 
development, by forcing public buyers back onto simpler, uniform solutions.) 
At the same time, however, competitive dialogue almost certainly increases reputational 
risk, for both the buyer and the financier (here the World Bank), precisely because it is a 
dialogue.  The exchanges between offerors and the government customer typically take place 
privately, and open an array of opportunities for corruption. World Bank policymakers know 
that, and though many officials argued that they opposed competitive dialogue because it is too 
complex for young procurement systems, in fact that reputational risk may have been a major 
reason for the Bank’s longstanding opposition to competitive dialogue. 
The Bank’s embrace of competitive dialogue thus tells us much.  The fact that the Bank 
resisted competitive dialogue for so long gives us some insight into the Bank’s keen sensitivity 
to reputational risk; that is natural, given the Bank’s exposure to criticism (often from those 
hostile to its philanthropic mission) and the deeply corrosive effect that corruption (a risk with 
any competitive dialogue) can have on the Bank.  At the same time, the fact that the Bank did 
eventually embrace competitive dialogue because the Bank realized it was falling out of step 
with emerging best practices, and the fact that the Bank’s change of heart has helped persuade 
others to embrace competitive dialogue as well, confirmed the important role the Bank plays in 
defining and modeling best practices in procurement. 
7. Capacity Development
The Bank’s roles in defining best practices and driving reform in procurement go hand-
in-hand with the Bank’s commitment to building capacity.  In procurement, building capacity 
means helping governments and societies do procurement better, to ensure that those 
governments can buy the best possible goods and services for the people they serve.94  Capacity-
building can mean training and counseling government personnel, and it can mean building 
understanding in the private sector as well, among contractors and their personnel, and in the 
institutions and professions that support the procurement system.  Recognizing all this, the 
World Bank and other multilateral development institutions have long supported capacity-
building efforts in the developing world, and strengthening capacity is a building block to 
effective aid. 
94 See, e.g., UNDP, Public Procurement Capacity Development Guide (2010), available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/undp-procurement-
capacity-assessment-users-guide/Procurement%20Capacity%20Assessment%20Guide.pdf; Sope Williams-Elegbe, 
Beyond UNCITRAL: The Challenges of Procurement Reform Implementation in Africa, 2014 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 
209, 210-15; Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 2, at 249-50; Christopher Yukins & Ruairi Macdonald, Capacity 
Building in Public Procurement: Burma/Myanmar–A Case Study, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 749 (2015). 
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In a series of declarations and commitments,95 the international development community 
has recognized the importance of capacity-building to successful procurement policy.  One of the 
most comprehensive plans for building capacity was published by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2015, in a model built around a “steering committee” 
of stakeholders brought together to build capacity in procurement: 
1. Provide leadership: Creating the steering committee
The first step is to create the steering committee, to include all relevant stakeholders to 
co-ordinate all activities as well as the strategy. 
2. Identify the issues: Assessing the public procurement workforce 
This diagnostic step is necessary to assess the current needs in terms of institution 
capacity, staff competency and the education system. 
3. Establish perspective: Identifying the goals 
The steering committee should identify and prioritise the goals in terms of people and 
institutions, professionalising the procurement function and jobs. 
4. Seek solutions: Finding the appropriate training solutions  
The strategy recommends different types of training in terms of duration, institutions and 
format, depending on the needs. 
5. Design the programme: Drafting the strategic action plan
The strategic action plan should include scheduled objectives, actions, and timeframe, 
while identifying the beneficiaries of the actions. 
6.  Include training: Drafting the training action plan 
The training action plan will depend on the needs, and should focus on training solutions 
for designated individuals and institutions. 
7. Remember resources: Financing the strategy 
The financing is a key step for the success of the implementation of the strategy. The 
steering committee should consider different options and models from internal and 
external donors. 
8. Monitor the results: Learning and adapting
The last step is important to identify best practices or unsuccessful solutions with 
constant adaptation of the trainings.96
95 See, e.g., OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement, Art. IX (2015), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/recommendation/OECD-Recommendation-on-Public-
Procurement.pdf.  
96 OECD, Roadmap:  How To Elaborate a Procurement Capacity Strategy 6 (2015), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/governance/ethics/Roadmap-Procurement-Capacity-Strategy.pdf.  
Janos Bertok, Head of the Public Sector Integrity Division, and Paulo Magina, Head of the Public Procurement Unit 
at the OECD, played important roles in preparing the OECD Roadmap, with Kenza Khachani, an OECD policy 
analyst. 
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The OECD Roadmap explained how building capacity would reinforce each key pillar in a sound 
public procurement system, including (1) simple and clear rules that ensure access to 
procurement opportunities; (2) effective institutions to plan and manage public contracts; (3) 
appropriate tools for electronic procurement; (4) suitable, skilled human resources -- 
procurement officials, in other words; and (5) competent contract management.97  The Roadmap
reflects the “top-down” approach to capacity-building generally favored by large institutions 
engaged in procurement:  a government-focused, centralized effort to identify and instill key 
training goals in procurement, typically built around an established rules system.98
At least in principle this traditional approach to capacity-building in procurement, which 
works best from an established base of rules, put the World Bank in a quandary:  having 
endorsed a broadening use of borrower nation’s procurement systems, and having recognized the 
need to support capacity-building under the new procurement framework,99 which set of rules 
would form the foundation of the Bank’s capacity-building -- the Bank’s new procurement 
regulations or the borrower nations’ own rules?  The answer appears to be a “fit for purpose” 
approach, which focuses first on a borrower nation’s own capacity needs and not on training in 
the World Bank’s procurement regime.  The World Bank’s Directive -- Procurement in IPF and 
Other Operational Procurement Matters describes how support to borrowers for their 
procurement capacity-building will be structured, through direct support at the project level or as 
part of a country-wide initiative.100  With regard to its own procurement framework, the World 
Bank has posted various learning resources on its website,101 though not as part of a fixed 
curriculum, and the Bank has co-sponsored a “MOOC” (a “massive open online class”) to 
provide low- or no-cost online training in the Bank’s new procurement framework.102
97 Id. at 5. 
98 See, e.g., UNDP, supra note 94.  The OECD Roadmap notably cited the U.S. Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU), probably one of the world’s largest institutions dedicated to procurement training.  OECD, supra note 96, at  
96.  In federal fiscal year 2017, for example, DAU received approximately US $139 million in funding to train the 
defense acquisition workforce.  U.S. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), Chief Financial Officer, 
Operation and Maintenance Overview Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Estimates, at 147 (Mar. 2018), available at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/fy2019_OM_Overview.pdf.  The training 
at DAU is focused on ensuring that the thousands of members of the Defense Department’s acquisition workforce 
are trained in the U.S. government’s complex web of policies, rules and procedures for acquisition.  See, e.g., DAU, 
2016-2019 Strategic Plan (2016), available at 
https://www.dau.mil/about/PublishingImages/Special%20Interest%20Areas/StrategicPlan.pdf.  
99 See, e.g., World Bank, Procurement In World Bank Investment Project Finance Phase I:  A Proposed New 
Framework 25 (rev. Oct. 18, 2013) (“strengthening client institutional capability is a central theme of the proposed 
new framework and capacity building efforts and procurement reforms would form part of the Bank’s larger country 
engagement, the resources for which would be part of the country dialogue and priorities”), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROCUREMENT/Resources/ProcurementProposedNewFrameworkOctober2013
Final.pdf.  
100 World Bank, Directive -- Procurement in IPF and Other Operational Procurement Matters 6 (Nov. 1, 2017), 
available at https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/95d59b3ec7a84a8782207aa0609dea0d.pdf.  
101 E.g., World Bank, e-Learning Platforms, https://wbnpf.procurementinet.org/e-learning-programs.  
102 World Bank et al., Certificate Program in Public Procurement (MOOC), available at
https://www.procurementlearning.org/certificate-program-public-procurement-cppp/.  
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What the Bank’s new initiatives did not address, however, is probably the next historical 
phase in capacity-building, as the educational institutions in borrower nations mature and can 
provide procurement training in a private marketplace.  In that “bottom-up” environment, 
individuals make career decisions to advance in procurement, whether (for example) as 
contracting officials, vendor employees, investigators, lawyers, auditors or accountants.  To 
advance their careers, those individuals will seek out education in a private educational 
marketplace (which may still include public institutions, such as universities) that responds to 
that demand.  The private marketplace for capacity-building imposes far higher transaction costs 
(individuals must seek out, assess and purchase the training, and those offering training must 
market and sell continuously, in a rapidly evolving environment with generally loosely defined 
standards).  But those offering training in that “bottom-up” private marketplace can adapt much 
more readily to change, and the professionals who emerge from that “bottom-up” capacity-
building system are deeply invested in their training and committed to the procurement field -- 
and that, in turn, may mean that those individuals are more likely to resist corruption and 
embrace reform. 
V. Possible Responses to the Bank’s Shifting Role as a Monitor 
By focusing the Bank’s oversight on the points of greatest risk in the Bank’s loan 
portfolio, the World Bank’s procurement reforms are logical and efficient but open new areas of 
potential conflict.   
The chief risk involves the Bank’s oversight itself.  By design, the Bank has positioned 
itself as a third-party monitor in its projects around the world; by approving important milestones 
in those projects through the “no-objection” process, it serves as a monitor for its many 
stakeholders, including both its shareholders and its borrowers.  The economic literature teaches 
us, however, that a third-party monitor is uniquely trusted -- other parties may rely too heavily, if 
anything, on the impartial monitor -- and this can be highly disruptive if the third-party monitor 
fails in its role.103  To avoid this type of chaotic collapse, it will be important for the Bank to be 
transparent, and to clearly explain the new boundaries of its monitoring role. 
A good example of this problem is the Bank’s new complaints process, for monitoring 
bid challenges in borrower countries.  As the discussion above reflects, the Bank’s involvement 
remains very much that of a third-party monitor, and unlike corruption (which may elicit a 
debarment from the Bank directly through the sanctions system), a failure of procurement 
process will be monitored, but not necessarily remedied, through the expanded complaints 
process at the Bank.  This uncertainty regarding the Bank’s oversight may engender friction with 
both vendors and borrowers, as each set of stakeholders jockeys for the Bank’s intercession or 
acquiescence.  While that dynamic may bolster Bank officials’ tactical leverage in any given 
103 Christopher R. Yukins, supra note 37, at 70-71.  For other perspectives on agency theory in public procurement, 
see Agnieszka Chrisidu-Budnikagnieszka & Justyna Przedańskajustyna, The Agency Theory Approach to the Public 
Procurement System, 7 Wroclaw Rev. L. Admin. & Econs. 154 (2018), available at https://doi.org/10.1515/wrlae-
2015-0059; Omar Azfar, Disrupting Corruption, in Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption, ch. 8 
(Anwar Shah, ed., 2007), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/PerformanceAccountabilityandCombatingCorruption.pdf.   
Draft Chapter - World Bank Reforms - Christopher Yukins & Sope Williams-Elegbe v5 - AS POSTED.docx 
22 
procurement, the uncertainty of the new structure also may, over the long term, erode the Bank’s 
perceived authority as a monitor. 
Resolving this problem -- making clear the boundaries of the Bank’s oversight -- will be 
made more complicated by the Bank’s likely shift over the coming decades to relying more 
heavily on borrower country procurement systems.  The Bank’s new framework, as noted, will 
take a highly variable approach to that shift to country systems, and it is likely that some 
borrowers’ robust procurement systems will be approved long before others’, and the approved 
systems will garner less oversight from the Bank.  In practice, this may mean that the Bank’s 
direct oversight will grow more uneven over the coming years, potentially varying from country 
to country or even from agency to agency within the same country.  To ease this problem, it will 
be important for the Bank to be highly transparent regarding the scope, and practical reach, of its 
oversight of any given project. 
VI. Conclusion:  The World Bank’s Procurement Framework and Aid Effectiveness 
As the discussion above reflects, the World Bank’s new Procurement Framework was, in 
the words of one highly respected expert, more “evolutionary” than “revolutionary.”104  Reform 
had been a near-constant in World Bank procurement over many decades, and as one former 
World Bank procurement official noted, the Bank, “to address its client countries concerns and to 
improve the overall effectiveness of its actions,” had long “attempted to develop a procurement 
policy beyond its narrow fiduciary responsibility.”105 The question, then, is how the latest 
iteration of reform, the Bank’s Procurement Framework, measures against international goals for 
aid-effectiveness. 
Even before the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, the Bank’s 
procurement policies sought to “establish modern and simplified procurement rules, to 
harmonise public procurement rules among donors and to build procurement capacity in Bank’s 
client countries.”106  Drawn against that history of reform, the Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda for Action marked important inflection points in development policy internationally,107
and they provide useful benchmarks to assess the Bank’s most recent procurement reforms, in 
terms of aid-effectiveness. 
In keeping with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, the World 
Bank’s recent procurement reforms clearly set out to strengthen borrower nations’ operational 
capacity in procurement.  The Bank’s capacity-building efforts, as noted, focus first on building 
capacity under borrowers’ own systems, and not merely in the Bank’s procurement regime.  The 
Bank’s reforms also respect borrowers’ leadership in their own development.  Borrowers assess 
their own projects risks, and even when Bank personnel are called in to provide direct support, 
104 Peter Trepte, supra note 15, at 121. 
105 Jean-Jacques Verdeaux, The World Bank and Public Procurement: Improving Aid Effectiveness and Addressing 
Corruption, 2006 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA179. 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., Laurence Chandy, It’s Complicated:  The Challenge of Implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effeciveness, Brookings, Sept. 22, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/its-complicated-the-challenge-of-
implementing-the-paris-declaration-on-aid-effectiveness/.  
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that assistance will be structured to preserve borrowers’ decisional autonomy.  When problems 
arise in contract formation, the Bank generally will defer to the borrower nations’ own 
complaints system. 
That said, the Bank’s procurement regime remains highly prescriptive.  The Bank’s 
oversight turns largely on the Bank’s perceived risk -- not necessarily on the project risks for the 
borrower or the affected citizens.  The Bank has retained its right to prior review where 
borrowers use what the Bank views as inherently risky methods or criteria, such as competitive 
dialogue or sustainability, and those risks are clearly viewed from the Bank’s perspective as a 
fiduciary for its shareholders. 
With regard to the use of country systems -- a key pillar of the aid-effectiveness agenda -- 
the Bank’s Procurement Framework remains a promise unfulfilled.  “Alternative Procurement 
Arrangements,” the current name for the use of country systems, have still not been formalized.  
Jeff Gutman, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former official at the Bank, remains 
pessimistic about the initiative’s prospects: 
From the first High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and the Rome Declaration (2003), 
to the Paris Declaration of the second Forum (2005), then the Accra Agenda for Action 
(2008) and the Busan Accord (2011), generally the OECD donors and the MDBs 
committed to a range of principles and initiatives. While the intensely negotiated 
communiques did have a significant impact on the harmonisation of policies and 
procedures, including for procurement, the parallel focus on the use of country systems 
was vague, more of a politically correct right-minded statement. As a participant in the 
Accra negotiations, it was clear to the current reviewer that the high-level donor officials 
did not have any specific target or understanding about what country systems implied 
whether for public financial management, environmental and social safeguards or 
procurement. This became evident during the various attempts at the World Bank to 
pursue country systems for procurement.108
What seems to be slowing Alternative Procurement Arrangements is a lingering concern with 
corruption.  Where corruption exists,” the Paris declaration noted, “it inhibits donors from 
relying on partner country systems.”   
There may, though, be a deeper problem -- an uneasy sense that allowing borrowers to 
use their own country systems may have a centrifugal, diffusing effect on a vigorously 
centralized World Bank procurement system.  The same strong concerns arose in the U.S. 
procurement system when the Federal Aviation Administration was allowed to write its own 
regulations to supersede the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),109 which had been unified 
since 1984, and more recently as “Other Transaction Authority” (a sort of blanket waiver from 
108 See Jeff Gutman, supra note 85, at 97. 
109 See, e.g., Rand Allen & Christopher Yukins, Bid Protests and Contract Disputes Under the FAA’s New 
Procurement System, 26 Pub. Cont. L.J. 135 (1997). 
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the FAR) gained broader acceptance among federal agencies.110  In the U.S. system, as in the 
Bank, there is an abiding concern that fracturing a uniform regulatory regime will weaken the 
overall system. 
The World Bank’s new Procurement Framework is, in sum, a step on the road to reform, 
and not an end point.  The Framework earns mixed grades when assessed against the traditional 
measures of aid effectiveness, but it does reflect important reforms in how the Bank oversees and 
directs procurement in Bank-financed projects, and in how the Bank accommodates and nurtures 
procurement systems in the developing world. 
110 See, e.g., Scott Maucione, OTA Contracts Are the New Cool Thing in DoD Acquisition, Oct. 19, 2017, 
https://federalnewsradio.com/acquisition/2017/10/ota-contracts-are-the-new-cool-thing-in-dod-acquisition/.  
